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Being True, Sounding False
John T. Lysaker
“For all men live by truth and stand in need of expression.”
“The Poet,” Ralph Waldo Emerson
1 What follows explores a very particular thought. Philosophy’s native realm is error. It
is born there, and error is where it lives. And should it die, and I presume it can and
will, philosophy will feel more at home in the company of failure than success.
2 “Explore” is perhaps misleading. What follows less mines the thought, as if it were a
stable vein of ore, than keeps pace with it, or tries to, and from various angles—as if it
were on the move. Or not “as if.” It is. On the move.
3 The character of what follows is that of an essay, a venture that embraces its partiality
in order to expand it, tracks the mote in order to survey its orbit and the alignments
achieved along the way. In this, I refuse the temptation of a certain kind of objectivity,
one that attempts to secure itself by purging the subjective. But this is not to say that I
simply accept the subjective in the sense of defering to it, as if what dawned on me
were sufficient, even for me or concerning me. Rather, here the partial becomes the
basis of an experiment of sorts, one that establishes conditions in the hope of initiating
a chain of reactions.
4 In favoring the experimental, this essay is neither simply personal nor impersonal. The
experiences expressed here (in keeping with the sense of “expression” operative in
Emerson), are thus as much a matter for you as for me, both in the languages enacted
and in how they have been shaped. Moreover, their aim remains a certain kind of truth,
one I hope to clarify along the way.
we arrive again an innumerable
entering as if from another life
“Sea of Lanterns,” Anne Michaels
5 Philosophy’s native realm is error. It is born there, and error is where it lives. And
should it die, and I presume it can and will, philosophy will feel more at home in the
company of failure than success. I offer this thought in earnest even as I feel its ironies
ripple. How, after all, does philosophy uncover—is “discover” too strong?—and mark its
limits  without  casting  them  as  insights,  thereby  converting  humility  into  self-
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possession? And what happens as the claim recoils on its own assertoric character? Is
performative contradiction a dead end or the first contortion in a transformation? How
do I relate to myself in claiming to understand the sentences with which I begun? In
what way is this an act (perhaps just a pursuit) of self-knowledge? And what do those
sentences offer you, my varied addressees? “Is he serious,” you might rightfully ask.
Living serious, I wish one could say. 
6 Philosophy’s native realm is error. This thought is something of a touchstone for me, or
rather,  a  thoroughbass against  which other thoughts resound—some quite singular,
others  developed across  paragraphs,  still  others  requiring  a  whole  text  to  present,
maybe a handful strung across (and between) several ventures. And because it is so
dear, so intimate to what I take philosophy to require of me, I find myself compelled to
register it, recounting why I accept it, and to use that acceptance to reflect on what
philosophy has to offer, and how “truth” factors into that provisional address.
7 Learning is a humbling affair. It indicates that one was either mistaken or ignorant.
And  learning  is  not  alone  in  this  intimacy  with  error.  Surprise  is  also  bound  to
mistakes. What seizes our attention exposes our ignorance or some misstep—how cold
the water is, how hot the dancing lights, how unlike the two sisters, how differently
certain texts read thirty years later. Even experience is something like a child of error.
Were our anticipations always right, I doubt we would notice, and I doubt that anything
like “noticing”—one name for one movement between anticipation and occurrence—
would  ever  have  evolved.  As  Hegel  has  it,  experience  involves  a  self-surpassing
movement, and what is surpassed is usually—always in my experience—an inadequate
anticipation of what in fact appears. (As Emerson has it, experience is just this ongoing
movement within a broad, multi-surfaced expanse of selves and world, though many
travel innocently—or in conformity—as if they were unable to bear the task of relating
to themselves and reworking their accords and discords.)
8 Where would we be without error? I doubt we would be in-the-world as we are. To be
clear,  my  point  is  not  Heidegger’s  when  he  argues  that  we  are  ensnared  in  the
everyday,  and thus  forgetful  of  our  ownmost  possibility  for  being,  or,  in a  related
argument, that  our  absorption  in  the  world  of  beings  renders  us  forgetful  of  the
clearing event that enables us to be-there amid beings. I have something more prosaic
in mind. Were our relations with beings mostly adequate, the character of our being
would be quite different. Perhaps we would hover like Rilke’s angels, fruhe Gegluckte,
“early  successes,”  Gelenke  des  Lichtes,  “joints  of  light,”  catching,  like  mirrors,  the
rushing world and their own rush therein, presuming, that is, reflexion without friction
is possible.
9 But not to worry. The earliest scenes of instruction envelop us in error. As awareness
dawns, the world expands around our tiny hands, legs and mouths. Return to childhood
haunts—the woods behind the house, the swampy stream to its left. If you’re like me,
you’ll be startled. They seem so petite. But once they were too vast to survey: dandelion
and skunk cabbage, bull frog and toad, chipmunk, white tail deer, though variously,
depending  upon the  season,  which  was  itself  a  marvel—spring  peepers  despite  the
lingering snow. Not that such a site has been exhausted. That would just be another
error. Even keeping to the deceiving glow of universals, the scenes are rich beyond our
ken: pseudacris crucifer, symplocarpus foetidus, pine and birch in spring and fall, ground
water buried deep but seeping, granite and shale in Ossining, possibly from assunung,
meaning “place of stones” in a Lenape dialectic of Algonquin called Munsee, spoken by
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those also called Munsee, though several names swirl around the land I have in mind,
such as Wappinger and Kitchawanks (Grumet 117).
10 “We can never surprise nature in a corner,” Emerson writes, “never find the end of a
thread; never tell where to set the first stone” (Nature, Addresses, Lectures 124). It isn’t
just  that  nature  likes  to  hide.  It  also  likes  to  show  itself  variously  across  a  vast,
changing yet interlocked complexity,  synchronous in certain ways, asynchronous in
others—rock  and  water,  soil  accruing,  nurse  logs  and  ferns,  but  also  persons  and
people,  which in  my corner  of  Ossining,  New York,  involved migrations,  invasions,
microbes and murder. Our recurring introduction to the world is awash in this surfeit,
and so,  over  time,  anticipation and presumption open into  a  desire  to  know,  from
which philosophy springs.
11 But what about wonder? Yes, wonder (or astonishment), which Aristotle aligns with
philosophy—thaumazein (Metaphysics 982b.11-12). But philosophy only commences amid
the astonishing because we are oriented toward the world knowingly. Other replies to
astonishment are possible, after all: flight, worship, violence. But philosophy responds
with what was already underway, inquiry,  asking,  “what has occurred,  how, and to
what end?,” questions that arise because the astonishing confounds.
12 I have turned back into these imagined, inceptual scenes of surprise and astonishment
because they show, in part, that we become philosophical because we err. But error
haunts what follows as well. An eventual inadequacy seems to await each philosophical
venture. Even its most illustrious practitioners warrant correction. In fact, the greater
the  figure,  the  more  powerful  the  counter-stroke:  Aristotle  to  Plato,  Spinoza  to
Descartes, Hegel to Kant. My point is not that the squabbles of the philosophers are
unresolvable.  Aristotle  demonstrates  convincingly  that  ethical  deliberation  is
insufficiently oriented by definitions of the good überhaupt. Spinoza rightly argues that
the search for truth criteria opens onto an infinite regress.  And Hegel was right to
historicize  the  patterns  of  knowing  (and  doing)  that  propel  natural  consciousness.
Nothing  convinces  for  very  long,  and  many  exquisite  moments  are  born  in  the
realization and demonstration of another’s shortcoming.
13 Permit  me  a  more  extended  example.  Rorty’s  insistence  that  vocabularies  are  not
truth-functional  is  less  compelling  than  it  once  seemed,  at  least  to  me.  As  he
understands  them,  vocabularies  (e.g.  Newtonian  mechanics,  quantum  theory,
psychoanalysis), can only be tested in a circular manner, namely, by presupposing their
own domain of objects (say a world of wave and particle, or the unconscious and its
sublimations). And he concludes that vocabularies are invented or evolved rather than
discovered, and that such inventions or fictions enable the kind of discoveries that can
be hammered out in ways that are true or false, namely, at the level of sentences. 
14 I once affirmed this thought but it now seems unconvincing. Vocabularies do not arise
independently of discoveries, and so the truth (and falsity) of various discoveries is part
of the mortar that holds together a vocabulary’s outer and inner walls. (Newton did not
awake one morning to Newtonian mechanics, and Saul opened his eyes as Paul only
because he was already in the thick of a messianic, theistic context.) And that is no less
true if  we drop “invention” in favor of cultural evolution. The process of epistemic
change remains bound to discoveries and their contestation—an anomaly is a discovery
after all, and one communicated by way of a finite set of truth claims (as opposed to an
entirely new paradigm). It is thus not the case that paradigms die all at once. Instead,
they die in part because they are repeatedly cut by receive by truth-functional blades
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and so begin to wobble. Secondly, and more importantly, vocabularies must maintain
some kind of phenomenological fit if one is going to act on them. Rorty often invokes
psychanalysis as the kind of invention that could fuel self-creation rather than self-
discovery, although discoveries become possible once we accept the invention. But is it
just a matter of accepting the vocabulary (or not) without reference to experience’s
epistemic valence?
15 Imagine a  continuum marked by two extremes.  One involves  an apprehension that
leaves nothing unanticipated, including the logic and character of anticipation—call
this, after Hegel, absolute knowledge. At the other, nothing that has been anticipated
occurs—call  this  absolute  error.  How  would  you  respond  to  a  vocabulary  that
approached absolute error? Not just that you kept misinterpreting your dreams. There
were never any “dreams” to interpret, and so the invitation to do so found nothing to
address. Not that you found the “death instinct” odd, but that desire itself, sexual or
otherwise, seemed profoundly alien? Rorty’s pragmatism invites us to accept and reject
vocabularies depending on our interests. But a vocabulary approaching absolute error
would prove unable to further any interest, or include a term as felicitous (if vague) as
“interest” or “vocabulary” for that matter. 
16 My point is not that Rorty’s point is a wholesale error. If anything, it works well enough
to run counter to the point he wants to make. More specifically, his distinction between
sentence and vocabulary has some traction, that is, it brings us into a working relation
with some swath of our experience. It helps me think about different approaches to
similar phenomena, something I  might miss if  I  kept to the level of sentences. Yes,
“vocabulary”  is  a  metaphor  in  these  contexts,  but  it  is  somewhat  apposite  to  the
phenomena in question, that is,  “true.” I  no longer believe, therefore,  that one can
altogether detach vocabularies (or paradigms, or webs of inquiry, or epochs of being, or
discursive regimes, or patterns of inquiry) from epistemic considerations. (In fact, I’m
beginning to question the expediency of that whole range of concepts. Ironically, like
the notion of the conceptual scheme, they seem epistemically hubristic. But that is a
matter for another time.)
17 To be clear, binding philosophy to something like the desire to know does not settle the
question of the value of truth, nor abandon care of the self for know thyself. Addressing
sexual phenomena, one might, like Foucault, wonder whether discourses of pleasure
(the ars erotica) are not preferable to those that address sexuality only in order to know
it (the scientia sexualis). And one might, like Nietzsche, believe it preferable not to know
everything that our friends think about us, and allow such realizations to temper our
will-to-truth. But, even in denying truth a seat among the greater goods, it remains a
value. No discourse of pleasure can operate wholly outside epistemic considerations
without  dissolving  into  an  unordered  collection  of  directives  that risk  significant
(unintended) pain. 
18 I  have  been  arguing  that  philosophy  is  destined  for  error.  The  world’s  dynamic
complexity and the partiality of our movements through it (hence our access to it) lead
me  to  this  conclusion,  as  do  the  various  oversights  that  define  the  history  of
philosophy. We thus know that our substantive commitments will prove insufficient.
The curtain never rises, the beach washes away at the point of arrival. Philosophy is not
just born in error. Error is its native realm. But my recounting of Rorty hoped to do
double duty. Philosophy cannot take refuge in discourses indifferent to truth. Their
value to us is bound in part to the traction they provide, which is what I always took
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James to mean, when he claimed that the true is “only the expedient [“in the long run
and on the whole”]  in our way of  thinking,” meaning,  it  is  that which secures our
footing (106). And while the modifier “only” is hasty, one could hear it this way. We
grant certain claims the status of “truth” because they fit the scene in which they are
uttered. That is what we mean when we say of some remark that it is “true.” “To agree
in the widest sense with a reality,” James writes, “can only mean to be guided either
straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as
to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed. Better
either  intellectually  or  practically”  (102).  But  today’s  working  touch  is  tomorrow’s
clumsy grasp, and so even what merits the approbation “true” must remain open to
reassessment. “The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth
happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an
event,  a  process” (97).  Rather than simply valorizing expediency,  James’s  “only the
expedient” keeps us on our toes, and precisely because error awaits.
words that taste of an answer
“Sea of Lanterns,” Anne Michaels
19 Error. Truth. They delimit an expanse within which philosophy finds itself. But what
kind of insight is this? And what is a fitting way to accept it (presuming you do)? Born
in the midst  of  error,  philosophy cannot rest  in its  thrall,  at  least  not  simply.  One
always  seeks  an  advance  of  sorts,  even in  acknowledging  one’s  limits.  In  Giving  an
Account of Oneself, Judith Butler stresses again and again that our accounts are riddled
by  opacities  with  respect  to  desire  and  influence,  both  personal  or  cultural.  Our
accounts of ourselves are thus fragmentary. But such an observation occurs within an
account  of  oneself  (an  account  of  accounting),  and  it  is  offered  as  a  kind  of  self-
knowledge, which only thickens the question.
20 The last paragraph of Emerson’s “Experience” commences with the following: “I know
that the world I converse with in the city and in the farms, is not the world I think. I
observe the difference, and shall observe it” (Essays: Second Series 48). Tenuous as it is,
this sentence marks one of my footholds in philosophy, despite (and because of) how it
steadies itself on so much more than inferential ligature. The thought is too complex to
fully unpack, so I’ll focus on what chiefly pertains to what I hope is now our context.
Emerson claims to know something observable:  a  discrepancy operates between his
thoughts and that to which they refer, namely the world to which he belongs by way of
conversation.  But,  in  an  inversion  of  Fichte,  Emerson  converts  the  thought  into  a
practical stance—I shall observe it, as one might a holiday or sacred space (rather than
proceed as if the world I converse with were a moment in my self-presentation). Or, it
might be better to say that Emerson’s comportment is transfigured in his realization of
the discrepancy, which he elects to carry into future conversations.
21 In  the  manner  of  an Emersonian observance—that  is  how I  grasp the  kind of  self-
knowledge that registers our intimacy with error and the dependence of our bearings
upon truth. That is how I understand James when he claims that the true is “only the
expedient [“in the long run and on the whole”] in our way of thinking.”
22 In 2018, Stanley Cavell died at the age of 91. But that hasn’t stopped me from running
into him again and again.  At  the moment,  I  am resisting skepticism as a definitive
philosophical  position  without  supposing  to  have  overcome  it  or  caught  it  out  in
contradiction,  thematic  or  performative.  Error  not  only  awaits  our  ventures,  it
generates them as well,  and to live in acknowledgement of that is  to be poised for
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redirection,  what  Emerson would  term abandonment,  which captures  nicely  how a
change in view moves away from some commitments toward others, and with the kind
of affirmation that occurs when the validity of what we rush toward cannot be secured
ahead of time. (“Reckless abandon” the risk averse say; “joyful abandon” replies the
romantic.)
between the sea 
and the dream of the sea
“Sea of Lanterns,” Anne Michaels
23 “But,”  you might  suggest,  “truth has  more than one sense,  no?  Thus far  you have
limited  it  to  a  kind  of  adequation.”  A  fair  point.  Heidegger  has  argued  that
propositional truth presumes an event of disclosure in which something like a sentence
or belief can be said to be adequate or inadequate to its Sache, the matter at hand. And
he regards that event as a kind of originary truth. Now, one might regard this as a
stretch,  that  is,  a  poor  metaphor,  particularly  since  truth  as  disclosure  seems
epistemically indifferent. Disclosure occurs with the true and the false, and realizing
that, that is, agreeing with Heidegger, doesn’t improve one’s chances of avoiding error.
However,  the  event  of  disclosure  remains  part  of  truth’s  occurrence,  the  event  of
verity,  in  James’s  words,  and  so,  an  account  of  truth  proves  false,  in  the  sense  of
incomplete, if it fails to acknowledge an occurrence integral to the matter at hand. 
24 I’ve  staged  this  debate,  creatively  borrowed  from  Habermas,  because  both  lines  of
thought compel me. Heidegger’s transcendental argument leads us to richer reflections
about  the  ontological  dimensions  of  experience,  conceptualization,  and  reason’s
various modalities—each can be said to be an event, and one that unfolds beyond the
activity  of  any  subject,  whether  you  or  me,  Geist  or  God.  And  this  enables  us  to
historicize truth-claims without fully subjectivizing them. But note how Heidegger’s
account also aims toward a kind of adequacy, intellectual as opposed to practical (and
recall that James countenances both). Heidegger offers a descriptive claim concerning
relations that we describe as “true” and/or “false,” and he provides evidence on its
behalf, that is, other claims intended to establish its epistemic superiority; he knows
something his rivals do not. The text thus seems oriented toward truth as adequation,
even  as  it  exposes  one  of  the  ways  in  which  that conception  is  incomplete.  Said
otherwise, Heidegger’s account seems to place itself along the continuum of absolute
truth  and  absolute  error,  even  as  it  re-opens  the  scene  that  “absolute”  claims  to
arrange once and for all, thus allowing us to think anew about conceptual continua and
how they come to be and pass away.
because a true word, everywhere, is a samizdat
“To write,” Anne Michaels
25 I hope you have some sense of what I mean when I say: “philosophy’s native realm is
error,” and why I continue to regard “truth” as integral to philosophy’s Umwelt to the
point that truth is a constitutive concern of the generation, presentation and reception
of philosophical proposals. And I hope you will take both points as a shadow argument
for the claim,  “truth remains a  philosophically  interesting concept,”  even though I
won’t develop that position much further, or sufficiently specify in what (and toward
what) that interest lies. (So far, I’ve only suggested that “true” and “useful” have some
bearing upon one another.) Rather, I want to dig deeper into what I’m accepting when I
say:  philosophy’s  native  realm  is  error.  My  fear  isn’t  absolute  error.  How  would  I
recognize  getting  everything  wrong?  Whatever  falsifies  some  set  of  commitments
cannot itself be simultaneously falsified and still do epistemic work. In other words, I
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need to trust whatever shows me I’m wrong if anything is to prove wrong. As Austin
observes  in  Sense  and  Sensibilia:  “Talk  of  deception  only  makes  sense  against  a
background  of  general  non-deception….  It  must  be  possible  to  recognize  a  case  of
deception by checking the odd cases against more normal ones” (11). Nor do I fear (or
lament) the foreclosure of some absolute knowing. Although I cannot argue the point
here, I take that foreclosure to open and preserve the figure of the human, and to set it
within the expansions and contractions of a mortal relationality, a slice of which is
epistemically oriented, and inescapably so. Moreover, an infinity in the grip of learning
sounds, contra Hegel, more bad ass than bad. But here my concern is how philosophy
bears the thought that its native realm is error.
26 My reply begins with an observation. Philosophy offers more than the content of its
commitments. It also has, always has, its example. It has become customary to read
Socrates as an image of philosophy, to find in his manner of address an exemplification
of philosophical comportment. But when are such exemplifications not unfolding? Each
philosophical text enacts philosophy and in so doing presents itself as an example of
the examined life, a task that one cannot relinquish except in silence. (Try arguing that
the unexamined life is worth living.) Not that each text exemplifies philosophy equally
well, or even well, but every philosophical text is something of an apologia on behalf of
philosophy.
27 I have come to think exemplification in terms of bearing. I have committed to “bearing”
because it gathers so many moments integral to philosophy: (a) a general bearing or
manner—for example, ironic, experimental, or systematic, what we might align with
“voice” or “mood”;  (b)  the end toward which the writing bears (as one might bear
north),  say  a  better  self,  a  therapeutic  escape  from  philosophy,  a  post-theological
culture, or, god help us, a post-secular one; (c) that which we bear (as in carry) when we
write, namely texts, conversations, traditions, languages, but also economies and eco-
social webs of relation. Because that is a great deal to carry, a text must also endure
involvements that threaten to drag it from its path. An academic career might lead one
down a narrow line of inquiry or bind one to an unhelpful vocabulary; or,  a latent
nationalism might trap one in an exceptionalist history; or, an inherited metaphysics of
the subject might re-entrench the euro-American modernity one aimed to exit. In such
cases, philosophy proves unable to (d) bear, in the sense of endure, its historicity, or
more generally its  fatedness,  that nest  of  unpenetrated causes that Emerson insists
envelops  us  like  a  sea.  Finally,  philosophical  texts,  like  all  social  acts,  (e)  bear
consequences, perlocutionary and/or illocutionary, as a tree might bear a pitted fruit.
Said otherwise,  philosophical  texts bear futures within which they are contributing
variables, and these may or may not align with the ends toward which they deliberately
bear.
28 Error behind it, error ahead, philosophy still offers its manifold bearings. What is its
general manner? To what ends does it move? What does it carry enroute? How well
does it endure the load? And with what results? Consider this list a diagnostic as well as
a deliberative frame, questions to ask as we read and write philosophy with an eye on
exemplification. But can a text exemplify philosophy in better and worse ways? And if
so, in accord with what norms? I think several could and do come into play, including
goodness, justice, and freedom. Here I would like to explore a less obvious standard,
however. In English, one can say of another: they are a true friend, perhaps as one
might describe a Freundschaft as echt or say of another un amigo de verdad or un vrai ami.
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Likewise,  I  might  encourage  someone  to  be  true  to  themselves,  which  resonates,  I
think, with something like Und bleibt sich selbst treu. Phrases like this lead me to wonder
whether and how philosophy might be true to itself,  whether we can evaluate each
philosophical  text,  qua  apologia,  as  more  or  less  true  to  philosophy.  (Hegel  asks  of
various  gestalts—how  does  what  purports  to  be  knowledge  appear  under  these
conditions?  I  want  to  ask  something  similar  of  philosophical  texts.  How  does
philosophy appear here, and does it do so truly?)
29 This sense of “true” may strike you as odd. “Do you mean something like sincerity?” I
don’t think so. Sincerity involves agreement between stated and actual intentions, for
example, when I compliment someone on a paper or invite them to dinner. In either
case,  one  might  wonder:  is  he  sincere?  Not  that  such  questions  cannot  arise  in
philosophy. Some took delight in doubting the sincerity of Derrida’s texts. (Were they
serious?) As if he was putting us on, like Alan Sokal’s “Transgressing the Boundaries:
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” which Sokal submitted
to Social Text. But I am not imagining someone intentionally dissimulating. Rather, my
thought is that philosophy, like friendship, has a kind of practical character with which
one  can  be  in  or  out  of  accord.  That  is,  even  among  those  sincerely  pursuing
philosophy, a kind of discord can resonate, which I want to term “sounding false.”
30 Adorno  has  written:  “Nothing  is  more  unfitting  for  an  intellectual  resolved  on
practicing what  was earlier  called philosophy,  than to  wish,  in  discussion,  and one
might almost say in argumentation, to be right. The very wish to be right, down to its
subtlest form logical reflection, is an expression of the spirit of self-preservation which
philosophy is precisely concerned to break down” (70). Note the measure in question:
unangemessener, unfitting, inappropriate, even unreasonable. The worry isn’t error of a
descriptive nature. It is not unfitting for philosophers to make mistakes. Shit happens.
What is unfitting, out of step, is behaving in a way that runs counter to the practice in
question.  Philosophy,  Adorno  holds,  promises  something  other  than  dogmatism  in
Kant’s pejorative sense. The spirit of self-preservation prevents this, however, insofar
as it leads one to cling to a position in order to win (or appear to win) argument. And in
doing so, discord appears and one’s efforts sound false relative to philosophy, to what it
seeks and so asks of us. 
31 Let me generalize from Adorno’s  remark.  I  imagine we have all  been in arguments
where one or more interlocutors either try to win the argument or prevent another
from  doing  so.  (One  might  term  this  social  space  “graduate  school.”)  In  such
encounters, the thought of a collaborative advance away from absolute error and
toward insight gives way to lawyer-like point scoring and theatrics. Polemics, which is
a way of describing the general bearing of a text, carries some of this subversion into
philosophical writing.  “Genuine polemics approach a book as lovingly as a cannibal
spices  a  baby,”  Walter  Benjamin  writes  (460).  They  aim  to  foreclose  a  thought  or
position, and in a manner unconcerned with the richness on offer. In fact, a polemic
only considers what enables refutation. “Polemics mean to destroy a book using only a
few of its sentences,” Benjamin adds. “The less it has been studied, the better” (460).
32 A general,  hectoring bearing is  apparent in polemics,  which appear uninterested in
open  learning  processes  that  might  surprise.  The  polemicist  is  trying  to  win  an
argument in a zero-sum manner rather than pursue the conflict in a transformative
one. And that, qua philosophy, sounds false, as if the issue were something like war
pursued  by  other  means  rather  than  a  transfigurative  way  of  being  historical  by
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accounting for ourselves. More precisely, the polemicist does not allow the polemicized
to  account  for  itself,  and  that  forecloses  the  appearance  of  something  integral  to
philosophy, namely, an open exchange of views toward the end of some demonstrable
advance.
33 Part of the conception I am exploring, one that brings the notion of truth and falsity to
performativity—rather  than  leaving  it  to  assertoric  acts—derives  from  a  line  by
Emerson that Cavell has made famous. Addressing those who refuse to venture their
own thoughts (as well as those who might still try to), Emerson says: “This conformity
makes  them  not  false  in  a  few  particulars,  authors  of  a  few  lies,  but  false  in  all
particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four
not the real four: so that every word they say chagrins us, and we know not where to
begin to set them right” (Essays: First Series 32). I’ve often wondered about the sense of
“false” operating here, and about what precisely is being termed “false.” If every word
chagrins us, even another’s use of numbers, the problem is more general than a failure
to calculate properly or apply a concept according to a rule. And this is why it is so hard
to right such characters. Going about it the wrong way, they get it wrong even when
they get it right. 
34 But what does that mean? The problem isn’t ignorance, precisely, but conformity. I
may not know the logic of a base ten number system, or even be aware than one is in
operation, but that misstep leaves me naïve in a way that can be righted with a “did you
know…” intervention. But if my basic bearing is conformist, I’ll never look away from
the cool kids long enough to find my own way. And in philosophy, that proves fatal.
35 Philosophy requires us to think for ourselves, to inhabit the turn of our “therefores,” to
render beliefs commitments, and to accompany commitments into the conversations in
which they arose, ready for the reply of interlocutors, or the world’s brush and bump
should the working-touch of anticipation falter.  Euthyphro’s problem, or one of his
problems, is that he isn’t really there when the issue of what is pious or holy (to hosion)
arises. Despite his purported expertise in theological matters, what Euthyphro has to
say rings false in the mouth of someone concerned with the gods and their ways. (One
might even say, he sounds impious, which is part of Plato’s point, I take it—to contrast
Euthyphro’s faux piety with Socrates, who has been charged with atheism.) Imagine
now a scene in which someone within philosophy “…dares not say I think, I am, but
quotes  some  saint  or  sage,”  to  recall  another  Emersonian  line  cherished  by  Cavell
(Emerson, Essays: First Series 38). To be clear, the problem is not quotation; if anything,
the absence of quotation sounds false in a practice that is historically saturated. The
misstep lies with quoting in order to avoid being answerable. This avoidance, a kind of
self-flight is what renders each remark counterfeit in a philosophical exchange. Just
where philosophy was to be enacted something quite different appears.
36 When jargon and buzz words are used as jargon and buzz words, Emerson’s position
begins  to  sting.  Jargon-driven  or  summary  judgments  of  complex  matters  always
resound with a kind of falseness. Think of references to broad schools of thought—post-
structuralism,  deconstruction,  phenomenology,  pragmatism,  feminism—or  political-
economic  orders—liberalism,  neo-liberalism,  capitalism,  socialism,  communism.
Whenever they are invoked as such, and left to stand as such, as if their referents were
settled and our grasp of them thorough and uncontroversial, does anything definite
come to mind? I don’t think so, and so I wonder about how such remarks function. I
wonder  because  such  terms  are  surrounded  by  just  the  kind  of  discrepancies  that
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Emerson would have us observe. Many understand these terms in many ways and the
phenomena in question, by sheer size and dynamism, are wildly complex. And yet, that
breadth is  precisely what jargon suppresses,  as  if  the complexity at  hand were too
much  to  bear,  and  the  disagreement  that  accompanies  any  effort  to  corral  it
unwelcome.  Conformity  displaces  us  from  the  site  where  philosophy  requires  our
presence.  Jargon—as  opposed  to  technical  language—covers  over  those  sites  of
differentiation that philosophy aims to endure in order to let something more than
mere opinion order our conversations.
…don’t ever, you said in the dream
think I’ve gone
“I Dreamed Again,” Anne Michaels
37 I have been suggesting that being true to philosophy involves a kind of answerability,
which I have elaborated as a bearing averse to conformity, jargon, and the polemic. But
let’s  not  forget  where  we  began.  Philosophy’s  native  realm  is  error.  Being  true  to
philosophy thus entails, in part, remaining observant of philosophy’s errancy, which is
what I’d now like to consider, first by way of negation. As I understand it, thinking in
observance of errancy is not exhausted by or even principally a matter of theoretically
affirming falliblism—that only names the problem, and in the subjunctive; we might be
wrong. My point is that we will be wrong and should conduct ourselves accordingly. 
38 Almost certain that one’s view will  be surpassed, in part because we and the world
change, in part because we play but a part and are thus partial, one should anticipate
and court disagreement, extant and imagined. This not only tests one’s commitments
and the arguments behind them, possibly furthering them in unexpected directions,
but announces, performatively: philosophy embraces disagreement. And that deepens
the  formal  invitation  that  accompanies  all  writing  qua  address.  You  not  only  are
welcome to the conversation but invited to disagree. (I have in mind something like
Wittgenstein’s Investigations, which, in the form of an imagined interlocutor, gives free
reign to counter-intuitions,  as well  as the dialectic  of  Aristotle’s  Nicomachean Ethics,
which engages all manner of positions, whether encoded in the Platonic dialogues or
passed along by word of mouth.) 
39 One should also embrace the value of error. “As soon as he sides with his critic against
himself, with joy, he is a cultivated man,” writes Emerson, who also wrote of the friend
as  a  beautiful  enemy  (Conduct  of  Life 84).  In  this  context,  the  thought  is:  one  who
advances  our  insight,  even  at  the  expense  of  what  we  had  thought,  bears  a  gift.
Concretely, this entails a willingness to learn in public and to attest to having learned.
Aristotle  famously  remarks,  contesting  Plato,  that  piety  requires  him to  honor  the
truth above his friends. I am imagining something like Plato replying, with believable
joy: “yes, the good does not answer to one idea, Aristotle, my friend,” adding, “but tell
me again how we determine which exemplars should be ours?” 
40 I have allowed Plato this brief reply because not all disagreements are easily resolved
on  the  basis  of  reflectively endorsed  reasons.  One  might,  therefore,  leave  certain
disagreements  suspended,  at  least  until  a  convincing  resolution  announces  itself.
Heidegger’s remarks on truth, like his remarks on freedom, leave one wondering how,
if at all, they bear upon questions concerning the truth of beliefs and the freedom of
agents. One can, after all, be ontologically released or freed into a life of bondage, and
Gelassenheit amid the differential, abysmal scene of originary disclosure won’t give one
insight into the particular character of  any-thing.  But rather than take Heidegger’s
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distance from these concerns to indicate either his superfluity or profundity, one might
mark the distance as a matter for further thought, one that provokes us to think in a
manner  that  doesn’t  abandon  the  ontological  for  the  ontic  or  the  ontic  for  the
ontological, but maybe abandons, by working through it, that opposition.
41 Pausing  in  the  thick  of  a  contestation,  I  am  trying  to  expand  what  is  commonly
regarded as the principle of charity, if for reasons somewhat obverse to Davidson’s.
Rather than presume the overall cogency of a rival language because one needs to do so
in order to interpret it, I prefer to develop a rival view to its utmost because it may in
fact advance philosophy in ways one did not initially grasp. This is akin to the kind of
patience and generosity Judith Butler invokes in Giving and Account of  Oneself,  albeit
within  a  broader,  more  epistemically  ambitious  scene.  (Butler  focuses  on  narrative
recounting  whereas  I  am  equally  interested  in  more  formal-logical  justificatory
practices,  the  kind  Habermas  has  in  mind  when  he  introduces  Toulminesque
argumentation into his discourse ethics.)
42 But maybe “charity” is too tame a term for the kind of active, creative inheritance I
have in mind. The point is not to go easy on one’s interlocutors—or hard—but to pursue
possibilities with a kind of creative zeal even when they are not one’s own. Fred Moten
does  something  like  this  with  Heidegger’s  conception  of  truth,  which  involves  a
groundless,  opening  horizon  of  disclosure  that  allows  for  a  kind  of  anarchy  of
presencing,  what  Derrida  regards  as  dissemination.  As  I  understand  it,  Moten  is
concerned that  the language of  groundlessness  may lead us to equalize differential
fates, e.g. racial and/or socio-economic locations, thus obscuring how the ontologically
contingent can still ruin, even end your life. In Black and Blur, he thus insists: “This false
ubiquity  of  absence  manifest  as  the  proliferation  of  borders,  must  be  radically
misunderstood” (227). How? “And the trick, of course, is this refusal of border under
border’s constant imposition. In can’t simply act as if and’s segregation, however unreal,
doesn’t produce real effects” (227). Thinking, writing, and conversing in observance of
error is not a zero-sum game, therefore, or a commitment to indeterminate negation. It
rather essays possibilities, following out fault lines toward new disclosures it continues
to pursue. 
43 I am stressing the generative potential of charitable engagements because I would not
have my emphasis on error dead end in a posture of perpetual suspicion or insouciant
negation. Philosophy offered in observance of the discrepancies that surround it, and
offered before the errancy that awaits, can be described as provisional, albeit not just
epistemically. In a manner left to you, it may also belong to a stock of needed materials
or supplies, something to chew on and convert into energy, perhaps even a measure
taken before to deal with a need or contingency. I stress this because the observance I
aim  to  enact  is  not  simply  dubious  about  what  is  on  offer.  Rather,  it  is  a  way  of
attending to and accompanying what presumably will provide some kind of working
touch with the world. 
44 Moten is again instructive. “Speak, so you can speak again” (152). I take the claim to be,
address yourself in such a way that a reply, a response—from various quarters because
the “you” is in the plural—is not only possible but invited as well as provoked. For
instance  (and  building  upon  what  I’ve  said  thus  far),  underscore  that  one  also  is
responding, that response is how thought comes to pass. Moten finds something like
this in Thorton Dial’s (1928–2016) art. In certain cases, such as “History Refused to Die”
(okra stalk and roots, clothing, collaged drawings, tin, wire, steel, Masonite, steel chain,
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enamel, and spray paint—2004), Dial reworks the already worked (including “art” and
“artist”),  says  it  anew in  a  way  that  initiates  an  experience  without  presuming  to
complete what emerges. Instead, that is left for another, although, if received in kind,
one might be invited back.
draw your breath
on paper
“All We Saw,” Anne Michaels
45 There is  much more to  say about  the philosophical  bearing I  have been sketching,
including the normative cast of such performances, particularly given the historicity of
philosophy’s character. But I want to end with a brief look at philosophy’s place in the
contemporary research university, particularly given the provisional nature of what
philosophy has to offer. 
46 If  we take truth to  be  a  radial  category,  one centered in  paradigmatic  cases,  then,
sociologically speaking, the fact of empirical inquiry is the paradigmatic case of truth.
In  such  matters,  “true”  and  “false”  are  terms  of  praise  and  blame  for  inductive
generalizations made by and for experts on the basis of representative samples. And
that is the sense of “true” that underwrites the knowledge whose production justifies
the existence and operating budgets of research universities. Not that such institutions
are satisfied with keeping such discoveries to expert communities. Increasingly, they
champion a kind of public scholarship that requires experts to communicate results
without really showing how they got there. 
47 How easily does philosophy move within this figure of the public scholar? Not only does
philosophy move rapidly to second-order questions presupposed by positive inquiry
and its results, but its reflexivity requires it, simultaneously, to reflect on its claims and
their mode of presentation. It thus can never simply share its “results” and have them
remain philosophical. Philosophy has to show its work if it is to remain philosophical.
“God exists” can be a cogent sentence in various settings. But left on its own, it fails to
prove philosophical. It could be a prayer, or a categorical refusal to explore a matter
openly.  For it  to be philosophical,  it  must be enacted within a reflexive practice of
reflection and justification of one sort or other, and if what I’ve said here holds, one
that observes its intimacy with error. 
48 Consider now my turn to bearing as the front foot of philosophy, as the deepest source
of  whatever  provisions  it  provides.  It  is  difficult  to  square  this  with  knowledge
production, particularly if one is also expected to publicize one’s results. But maybe
this  shouldn’t  surprise  us.  Plato’s  legacy is  Socrates  more than any thesis,  and the
dialogue form more than any doctrine. While there are few remaining Cartesians, the
idea  of  something  like  a  series  of  meditations,  particularly  when  combined  with
objections and replies, remains vibrant. And didn’t Hegel provide Marx with immanent
critique and determinate negation, and thus enable the undoing of his own Philosophy of
Right? When I read Du Bois, what startles me the most is the range of reflections he
brings to the color line: history, sociology, fiction, autobiography, music, and political
philosophy. So too Beauvoir—something like genuine, historical thought vibrates in the
concreteness of conceptions that nevertheless resist positivism. Each of these author’s
leads with their example, which overrun their results. 
49 Let me close,  therefore,  with a conundrum. How does philosophy engage a broader
public while remaining true to itself? How does one make one’s bearings apparent? I
think the figure of the expert peddling results misses the mark. I would rather remain
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Socratic in the sense that everything we do, like Plato’s Socrates, is also an image of
philosophy, and one haunted by ignorance. Philosophy’s native realm is error. It is born
there, and error is where it lives. But even as it falls prey to error, its example admits of
praise and blame, such as being true to philosophy, or,  in the name of philosophy,
sounding false.
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sense, but that certain performances can themselves be true as when a friend is a true friend.
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